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CATV: Liability for the Uncompensated
Transmission of Television Programs
Community antenna television systems currently trans-
mit television programs to their subscribers without pay-
ing compensation either to the program originator or
the copyright proprietor. The author of this note exam-
ines the legal theses which may require CATV to com-
pensate for the use of television programming. He
concludes that while the activities of (ATV amount to
copyright infringement, a balancing of competing inter-
ests requires the substitution of a more flexible device.
INTRODUCTION
The demand for television service in areas with too small a pop-
ulation to support a local television broadcasting station and too
remote in distance or isolated by terrain to receive regular off-air
reception has led to the development of community antenna tele-
vision systems (CATV).' These consist of tall receiving antennas
located on high terrain where usable television signals from distant
cities may be received, equipment to amplify these signals (and
sometimes to convert them from the channel on which they are re-
ceived to a different channel), and cables to carry them to individ-
ual television receiving sets2 Some CATV's utilize microwave com-
mon carrier facilities to receive signals from more distant stations,
and to improve the quality of the distributed signalY Microwave
systems pick up the original signals near their sources and trans-
mit them through the air to the CATV receiving antennas.
Assertions have been made that CATV's have originated program
material or advertising, or deleted program material or adver-
tising run on the station whose signal is carried, but those prac-
tices appear to be rare exceptions.4 Although there are some co-
1. Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Trans-
lators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Develop-
ment of Television Broadcasting, 26 FCC REP. 403, 407 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 Inquiry].
CATV's now service such cities as New York where tall buildings make
normal reception poor. Wall Street 3., Dec. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
2. 1959 Inquiry 407.
3. Only about 250 to 300 of the 1600 CATV's employ microwave facilities.
Id. at 409.
4. 1959 Inquiry 407-08. However, a number of CATV's have additional
channels on which "dosed-circuit" telecasts of programs or advertising, or
FMI music are presented. Id. at 408.
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operatives, most CATV's are profit seeking organizations," with
subscribers paying installation fees and monthly service charges.
Although CATV's were originally developed in areas where satis-
factory direct television reception was not possible, they have
continued to expand, even where direct reception is available, as
a means of providing subscribers with additional channels." In
1959, 750 CATV's served half a million TV homes; at present
1600 CATV's serve 1.7 million of the nation's 52.7 million TV
homes.'
This rapid growth has triggered controversy and litigation
among CATV's, broadcasting stations,9 and owners of literary
property.' ° Some of this controversy will be reduced by the recent
promulgation of rules by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) governing CATV's serviced by microwave common
carrier facilities." The FCC also declared that it would extend
the rules to nonmicrowave CATV's if Congress does not act;12
however, there is some doubt if the FCC has this power. 5 More-
5. Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Licensing of CGom-
munity Antenna Television Systems, S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
3, 4 (1959).
In 1965, TelePrompter Corp. had first quarter profits in excess of $70,000
on gross revenues of $1,167,215. About 70% of TelePrompter's 1964 business
was in CATV's. Wall Street J., May 5, 1965, p. 10, col. 2.
6. The installation fee ranges from a few dollars to $175.00. Service
charges range from $2.75 to $10.00 per month. Some CATV's assess no instal-
lation fees, but charge higher monthly rates. See Senate Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, supra note 5, at 4.
7. 1959 Inquiry 408. Some CATV's may soon provide as many as 12
channels. Wall Street J., March 26, 1965, p. 3, col. 4.
8. Wall Street J., Dec. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
9. E.g., Cable Vision, Inc., v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 13 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1965); Intermountain Broadcasting & Tele-
vision Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961).
10. See Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1965, p. 15, col. 2; Wall Street J., Dec. 14,
1964, p. 2, col. 2.
11. The microwave linked systems must, 1) carry the signals of the all local
television stations without material degradation in technical quality, and 2)
abstain from duplicating local commercial programs by use of a source other
than the local stations 15 days before and 15 days after they are broadcast
locally. FCC, First Report on Microwave Relays, 4 P & F RAD o REG. 2d 1725
(1965) [hereinafter cited as FCC, First Report]. See generally SEmiN, AN
EcoNomc AwALYsIs OF Co1Anumny ANTENNA TELEvIsION SYsTEms AND
TM TELEVIsioN BROADCASTING INDUSTRY (1965).
12. FCC, Regulation of CATV Systems, 4 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1679
(1965).
13. In 1959 the FCC itself concluded that it did not have the power.
1959 Inquiry 441. See the extensive discussion of the jurisdictional question
in FCC, supra note 12 at 1707 (1965).
over, an extension of the present rules to all CATV systems
would not affect the right of an originating broadcaster or a copy-
right proprietor in a civil suit against a CATV for the unauthor-
ized use of broadcast material 14 It shall be the function of this
Note first, to evaluate the possible legal liability of CATV's under
the current law of unfair competition, tortious interference with
contractual relations, and copyright; and second, to propose a
solution which will properly balance the rights of broadcasters,
copyright proprietors, CATV's, and the viewing public.
I. UNFAIR COIEPETITION
The tort of unfair competition arose as an outgrowth of the
law of trademark infringement. 5 The tort was later broadened
to forbid "palming off."' 8 So viewed the essence of the wrong was
fraud - misrepresentation of the origin of the goods so as to mis-
lead the consuming public as to the identity of the producer.
Finally, the Supreme Court in INS v. AP,17 discarded the require-
ment of "palming off" and adopted a new set of equitable prin-
ciples designed to elevate the morality of the market place. The
unjust enrichment resulting from a competitor's reaping where
it had not sown was meant to replace fraud as the gravamen
of unfair competition.' However, with few notable exceptions,' 9
14. The rules do not prohibit ACATV's from duplicating local commercial
programs more than 15 days before or after it is broadcast locally, and do
not require CATV's to secure permission to transmit signals. Nor, do they
affect the copyright question:
A number of participants in these proceedings urge us to incorporate in
our rules an express declaration that nothing in them is intended to
affect in any way the copyright or other rights that broadcasters or
others may have in television program material. We think incorporation
of such a declaration in the rules is unnecessary .... We have also noted
that such suits fall entirely beyond our jurisdiction .... Our determina-
tion does not rest, however, on any theory concerning the requirements
of copyright or any federal or state law other than the provisions of the
Communications Act ...Nor is anything we have said or done in-
tended to affect the determinations of other federal or state tribunals as
to matters within their jurisdiction.
FCC, First Report 1787.
15. See WARNr, RADio AND Tmv vsioN RIGHTs 890 (1953); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 flAnv. L. Rnv. 1289, 1291-93 (1940).
16. See, e.g., Elgin Natl Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S.
665 (1901).
17. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
18. Id. at 239.
19. See AP v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1935), rev'd on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. KQV Broad-
casting Co., !24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v.
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the courts have refused to accept the unjust enrichment theory
of unfair competition.0
Whatever residual effect the INS rationale may have had
appears to have been terminated by the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiff e Co.2' and Compeo
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. The plaintiff in each case
sought to prevent a competitor from copying his product by as-
serting both design patent infringement and unfair competition.
The district court in rejecting the first ground declared the pat-
ents invalid, but granted relief on the ground of unfair competi-
tion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under Illinois
law no showing of "palming off" need be made. The Supreme
Court reversed both decisions, holding that absent a showing of
"palming off," a state's unfair competition law cannot impose
liability for, or prohibit, the copying of an article unprotected by
patent or copyright.25 The Court in broad dictum reaffirmed the
strong public policy favoring free access to matter in the public
domain:
When an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would
interfere with the federal policy . . . of allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain.24
The reasoning of the Court in Sears and Compco may be re-
duced to the following syllogism: competition is the first prin-
ciple of our economic system; only in carefully restricted situ-
ations does the patent and copyright law isolate selected creations
from competitive copying; a state may not, therefore, use its law
of unfair competition to frustrate the federal acts by protecting
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30
N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
20. See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952);
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 811 U.S.
712 (1940); Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal.
1950); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspapers Publishing
Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Mass. 1942); Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
21. 376 U.S. 225 (1961).
22. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
23. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). For an extensive
discussion of the two cases see Bender, Brown, Derenberg, Handler & Leeds,
Product Simulation: A Right or Wrong., 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1178 (1964).
24. 876 U.S. at 237.
works in the public domain. Although neither Sears nor Compeo
involved statutory or common law copyright, the equating of
patent with copyright law by the Court cannot be dismissed as
mere dictim. Untrammeled access to products of the mind is at
least as important to society as is the free use of mechanical
devices2 5
Several recent New York cases have attempted to distinguish
both Sears and Compco, and on cursory analysis it may appear
that the New York courts will continue to apply the unjust en-
richment theory of INS. However, those decisions may be ex-
plained for the most part by the theory of common law copyright.
In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited,
Inc.." the court held that the use of off-air recordings of a news
commentator's announcement concerning the assassination of
President Kennedy constituted unfair competition. On applica-
tion for reargument it was held that the announcement was an
unpublished work subject to common law copyright. 7 A similar
reading may be given to the "Beatles" Record Case.8 In the New
York World's Fair CaseP9 the Appellate Division enjoined the de-
fendant from selling postcard photographs of the fair buildings.
Though the court spoke in terms reminiscent of INS, its result
arguably can be reconciled with Sears and Compco on the ground
that the novelty of the pavilions gave rise to a common law copy-
right which survived the erection of the structures. Since the pic-
tures were taken on the plaintiff's private property, it could also
be contended that the defendant's actions violated an implied
condition of his permit to enter the grounds. A narrow reading of
the New York cases appears warranted in light of a New York
court's application of Sears and Compco to a case which would
previously have been within the INS rationale.80
In Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc 3 1 the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the Sears and Compco rationale to prevent a local station
25. INS v. AP, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. 42 M isc. 2d 723, 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
9,7. Ibid.
28. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252
N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
29. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers,
Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964).
30. Wolf & Vine, Inc. v. Pioneer Display Fixture Co., 142 U.S.P.Q. 112
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). But see Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp.,
385 F.Rd 774 (2d Cir. 1964).
31. 835 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
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from recovering against a CATV operator on the theories of unfair
competition and tortious interference with contractual relations.
The district court granted relief on the ground that the exclusive
"right of first call" was a sufficient "quasi-property" right to be
protected under the unjust enrichment analysis of INS 2 The trial
court reached its conclusion without regard to and apart from any
question of copyright ownership of particular program content 3
The appellate court reversed, holding that Sears and Compco pre-
vented application of common law tort theories to protect what
are in essence copyright interests:
As we read Sears and Compco, however, only actions for copyright
infringement or such common-law actions as are consistent with the
primary right of public access to all in the public domain will lie.3 4
To the extent, then, that the District Court holding extended a new
protectible interest beyond what the copyright laws confer, it "... in-
terfere[d] with the federal policy . . . of allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public
domain." 5
In the absence of "palming off," if the broadcaster cannot es-
tablish a valid copyright the programs transmitted fall into the
public domain. 8 In Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antenna-
vision, Inc 1a a Florida circuit court followed Cable Vision and
held that Sears and Compco prevented recovery based on an
unjust enrichment theory of unfair competition in a suit of a local
television station against a CATV. A CATV does not "palm off"
programs as its own within the meaning of Sears and Compco.
On the contrary it never claims to be more than a conduit for
programs produced by others and the originating broadcaster
receives full credit for his production. Therefore, the television
industry cannot invoke the doctrine of unfair competition to
prevent CATV systems from retransmitting broadcast signals.
I. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
In both Cable Vision and Herald Publishing the plaintiff also
alleged interference with contractual relations, a tort generally
32.. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp, 47, 58 (D. Idaho 1962).
33. Ibid.
34. 835 F.2d at 350.
35. 835 F.2d at 351 (the court quoted from Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)).
36. See Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1964);
cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiflel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 876 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
37. 145 U.S.P.Q. 437 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1965).
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based on inducing or causing a party to a contract not to perform
a contractual obligation s The contract between the originating
broadcaster or copyright proprietor and the local station usually
gives the latter a temporary exclusive right to broadcast particu-
lar programs; arguably CATV transmissions of the same pro-
grams interfere with the exclusive rights purchased by the local
station. However, as the court in Cable Vision pointed out, par-
ties may not create exclusive rights of use by contract when the
subject matter of the contract is in the public domain 9 To hold
that the CATV was exceeding the bounds of legitimate compe-
tition would first require a finding that the contracting parties
had exclusive property rights in the programs being broadcast.
This would not be the case in the absence of a valid copyright.
Moreover, the network station does not break its contract with
the local station when a program is relayed over a CATV; the
only interference with the contractual relation is a lessening of
the value of the local station's right of first call by competition.
In summary, the cumulative effect of Sears, Compco, and
Cable Vision requires the conclusion that, absent "palming off,"
a CATV can be prevented from using programs only if they are
protected by a valid common law or statutory copyright.
III. COPYRIGHT
In the United States literary property may be protected by
either common law or statutory copyright.40 Common law affords
the author of an original, unpublished literary work a perpetual
monopoly in his work.4 If the work is "divestitively published,"
however, the common law copyright terminates and, unless the
work is copyrighted under the Copyright Act, it becomes a part
88. See, e.g., Meyer v. Washington Times Co., 76 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir.
1935); Alcazar Amusement Co. v. Mudd & Colley Amusement Co., 204 Ala.
509, 86 So. 209 (1920).
39. 835 F.2d 348, 351 (1964). See Desclee & Cie., S.A. v. Nemmers, 190
F. Supp. 381, 389 (D. Wis. 1961); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 N.Y.S.2d 35
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
40. The Copyright Act expressly provides for the continued viability of
common law copyright.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of
the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in
equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor.
17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
41. E.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1908); Holmes
v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657
(1834); Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 419, 421, 115 P.2d 983, 984
(1941).
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of the public domain. 2 The Copyright Act, upon compliance with
certain formalities, protects published and some unpublished
works for a maximum duration of 56 years.4
The owners of copyrighted literary property are injured eco-
nomically when the activities of CATV's diminish the income de-
rived from licensing their material to television broadcasting sta-
tions. 44 Such licenses usually permit the material to be televised a
specified number of times within the station's normal reception
areas for free home use only.45 By so restricting each license, a
copyright proprietor can license the identical material to broad-
casting stations whose normal reception areas do not overlap.
However, when a CATV expands the reception area of a given
broadcast, the copyright proprietor's licensing market is thereby
diminished.
Although the copyright proprietor clearly suffers an economic
loss, it is not clear that copyright infringement has occurred. An
inquiry to determine whether a legal remedy exists necessarily
involves two questions: first, whether the content of television
broadcasting is a proper subject of common law or statutory
copyright; and second, whether the retransmission of television
signals by a CATV, assuming a valid copyright, is an infringe-
ment of any right reserved to the copyright proprietor.
A. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYPIGHT
Both statutory and common law copyright require that a
potentially protectible work be an original intellectual product.48
The requirement of copyright originality entails no more than
independent production, i.e., absence of actual copying. Neither
original thought nor independent research is required.4 The work
42. E.g., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909);
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899); Wheaton v. Peters, 83 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 657 (1834).
43. The initial 28 year term may be renewed for a second 28 year period.
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
44. FCC, First Report 1747-49.
45. Id. at 1748; 1959 Inquiry 414.
46. See Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657
(E.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1941); BALL, Tim LAw OF
COPYRIGHT 237-38, 479 (1944); Nnumwa, COPYRIGHT §§ 10, 11.2 (1965).
47. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1955); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
103 (2d Cir. 1951); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d
Cir. 1945); Amplex Mg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp.
285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co.,
31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929); Note, 68 HAnv. L. REv. 517, 524 (1955).
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need not be novel nor an accretion to the prior art.48 The possi-
bility of any qualitative factor in the requirement of copyright
originality has apparently been foreclosed by an authoritative
Second Circuit case. 9 Copyright protects only modes of ex-
pression, as opposed to ideas and underlying concepts; hence, a
protectible work must be a specific intellectual production. 0 This
requirement demands only that a subject be developed beyond a
minimal dramatic core or unembellished plot line. Every television
broadcast, by definition, satisfies this requirement of concreteness
since every program, regardless of its content, is a specific, detailed
expression. Statutory copyright requires in addition that the work
be a "writing," whereas common law copyright is not so limited!;1
When a program is performed pursuant to an "original" script
or recorded film, the proprietor thereof may either rest on his com-
mon law monopoly in the work or come under the statute by
investitively publishing. 2 But whether copyright may extend to
48. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith-
ographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1951).
49. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
50. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 1741 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1980).
51. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Un-
limited, Inc., 42 lise. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Nmn&ER,
COPYRIGHT J 11.1 (1965).
52. The content of television broadcasting may be divided into the follow-
ing general categories: drama; newscasts and other programs representing
nonstaged public occurrences; panel, quiz and game shows; and variety pro-
grams composed of separate performances.
Any program telling a connected story or portraying a series of related
events, whether serious or comedy, is registerable as a dramatic work under
§ 5(d) of the statute. If unpublished the script may be the subject either of
a § 12 or common law copyright; if published the script qualifies for § 10 pro-
tection. As an alternative, the film from which the dramatic work is broad-
casted qualifies as a photoplay under § 5(1) of the act and will receive the
same protection as the dramatic script.
Programs consisting of nonstaged public occurrences, such as broadcasts
of news or sporting events, arguably lack originality since the subject matter
of the film does not derive from the broadcaster's creative effort. The under-
lying event and the creative manner in which the event is represented must be
distinguished however. Granting copyright protection in this context amounts
to nothing more than prohibiting the blatant copyist from pirating the author's
mode of expression. West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed.
833 (2d Cir. 1910); Inter-City Press, Inc. v. Siegfried, 172 F. Supp. 37 (W.D.
Mlo. 1958); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing
Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D. Mass. 1942). No one is thereby prevented from
filming the same event or from describing the news. The prevailing view
1965]
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the act of broadcasting itself so as to protect an evanescent live
production of material not reduced to a script or film is unclear.
Since the existence of a tangible subject capable of deposit is
a sine qua non of statutory copyright, protection must be sought
outside of the statute. 3 Arguably, the elastic concept of common
law copyright could afford rights either in the broadcast itself
or in the performer's transitory production. There is no clear
constitutional requirement that common law protection be limited
to the "writings" of an author;5 4 in at least two states-New
appears to be that every film or photograph has the necessary attribute of
originality since the filmer must select a subject matter, camera angle and
time of exposure or film speed. See, e.g., Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co., 274 Fed. 932, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), af'd, 281 Fed.
83 (2d Cir. 1922). Section 5(m) of the act provides for the registration of
motion pictures other than photoplays. The copyright office regulations ex-
pressly includes within its definition of motion pictures other than photo-
plays "filmed television programs having no plot." 37 C.F.R. § 202.15 (b)
(1960).
Programs of the panel, quiz or game variety if reduced to film, become
motion pictures other than photoplays, and subject to registration under
§ 5(m) of the act. Component opening or closing monologues reduced to
writing may be registered under § 5(c) of the act or under the more general
provisions of § 4. The copyright office regulations include within § 5(c)
"monologs, panel discussions, and variety programs prepared for radio or
television .... 3 7 C.F.R. § 202.6 (1960).
Variety programs, consisting of a combination of acts, appear to be
governed by the same analysis. Film of the program is a motion picture other
than a photoplay within § 5(m). Any dramatic portion of the program, if
filmed, would qualify as a photoplay; if not filmed but embodied in a script
it would qualify as a dramatic composition. Any component monolog, if
reduced to a form capable of deposit, would come within § 5(c).
53. "The congress shall have power.., to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective 'writings and discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, § 8. (Emphasis added.)
"The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall
include all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
The term "writings" at least requires a permanent object capable of de-
posit and continued productive public use. Kalodner & Vance, The Relation
Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72
HAnV. L. REv. 1079, 1087 (1959).
54. Prior to Sears and Compco, the commentators universally agreed that
common law copyright extended to nonwritings. See, e.g., NnmER, COPYRIGHT
§ 11.1 (1965); Kalodner & Vance, supra note 53, at 1087; Warner, Protection
of the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law Copyright,
3 VAND. L. Rnv. 209, 219 (1950). It is clear, however, that a nonwriting can-
not be the subject of statutory copyright. See note 53 supra. If Sears and
Compco prohibit the protection of "works" not susceptible to statutory copy-
right, there can be no common law copyright in a nonwriting. In a footnote
York55 and Pennsylvania5 6 - an intangible performance right has
been recognized, and several federal courts, interpreting state
law, have reached a similar conclusion. 57 Public policy would
appear to favor recognizing a common law copyright in a live
television broadcast both to reward creative effort and to dis-
courage the blatant copyist. 58 Since most television broadcasts
are either based on written scripts or recorded on film, however,
the existence of a broadcast right per se is not of major signifi-
cance; the few live programs not based on a script, even if un-
protectible by common law or statutory copyright, could not
possibly support CATV.
B. CommoN LAw COPYRIGHT - DiVESTITVE PUBLICATION
Common law copyright grants to an individual a perpetual
property right in his unpublished original intellectual production,
unimpaired by the Copyright Act;5 9 however, publication of the
work terminates this right and, unless a statutory copyright is ac-
quired, the work becomes a part of the public domain." Hence,
if the act of broadcasting constitutes a divestitive publication,
CATV operators can transmit programs unprotected by statutory
copyright with impunity.
Divestitive publication takes place, with respect to works com-
mercially exploited by a sale of physical copies, when such copies
reference to Section 2 of the Copyright Act, Justice Black characterized it as
preserving common law copyright in "unpublished writings." Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964). Section 2, however, does
not refer to "unpublished writings" but to unpublished works. In Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723,
725, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the court found a common law
copyright in a nonwriting.
55. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited,
42 Misc. 2d 72, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964); Dane v. M. & H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q.
426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
56. See Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194
AtI. 631 (1987).
57. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir. 1956); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1955); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940).
58. The English copyright statute permits a broadcaster to copyright the
broadcast per se. Copyright Act, 1956, 3 & 5 Eliz. 20, c. 74.
59. See Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. -Copperman, 218 Fed. 577, 579 (2d
Cir. 1914); Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657
(E.D.N.Y. 1940), af'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1941); BALL, LAw oF Copy-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PRoPERTY 470-74 (1944).
60. See cases cited note 42 &upra.
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are made available to the general public.61 Hence the distribution
of copies of sheet music or books is a general publication.62 Public
access is determinative of publication, rather than the number
of copies sold. Several commentators assert that permitting un-
restricted access to even a single copy- for example, a library
copy - is sufficient to terminate all common law rights;6" how-
ever, the courts appear to apply a spectrum test. In White v.
Kimmel64 copies of a manuscript were made available to the few
persons desiring them for a nominal printing charge. Even though
the work had not been commercially exploited in any real sense
the court found a divestitive publication. When tangible copies of
a work are made available, therefore, either commercial exploita-
tion or dissemination fixes the point of publication.65
Several television networks send transcribed copies of some
program scripts, after broadcast of the program, to anyone re-
questing such a transcript.0 6 Using the Kimmel rationale such
programs would appear to be divestitively published when printed
copies are received by members of the viewing audience. CATV's,
however, transmit programs simultaneously with the original
broadcast; thus, their potentially infringing activities occur prior
to any divestitive publication attributable to dissemination of
program transcripts.
Works commercially exploited without the issuance of physical
copies have received quite different judicial treatment; exploita-
tion of a work by public performance is not considered a divesti-
tive publication. In Ferris v. Frohma,07 the Supreme Court held
that publicly performing a play before a paying audience did not
destroy the author's common law rights in the uncopyrighted
61. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957 (1952); McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S.D.N.Y.
1919); Schleman v. Guaranty Title Co., 153 Fla. 879, 15 So. 2d 754 (1943);
Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLm. L. REv. 185, 187 (1956), cf. 17
U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
62. See Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80
(2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Grandma Moses Properties, Inc. v.
This Week Magazine, 117 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); William A. Meier
Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 95 F. Supp. 264 (WI). Pa. 1951). See
also Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 84
Hun. 12, 32 N.Y. Supp. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
63. See BALL, op. cit. supra note 59, at 473; SPni G, Riss AmD Riamu's
111 (1952); Nimmer, supra note 61, at 187.
64. 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952).
65. See, e.g., SPRiNG, op. cit. supra note 63, at 110-12.
66. Both "Meet the Press" and "The Dan Smoot Report" offer program
transcripts to the viewing audience.
67. 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
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script0 8 Conceivably, under the Ferris holding a play can be per-
formed in every city in the country and, as long as no copies of
the script are sold, the author retains his perpetual common law
monopoly in the work. 9
It might be expected that the Ferris rule would have limited
application in cases involving the modem mass media: first, the
soundness of the reasons for treating a performance differently
from a sale of tangible copies can be questioned;7 and, second, the
operations of the modem mass media result in a broader range
of dissemination and commercial exploitation than that resulting
from the performance of a play. Nonetheless, Ferris has been
followed in mass media cases. In Patterson v. Century Prods.,
Ic., 71 a motion picture film was held to be unpublished even
though it had been distributed to many separate groups and
viewed by thousands of people. Since the spectators were allowed
to view the film only, and received no tangible copy, the court
determined that the common law copyright in the script had not
68. Justice Hughes reasoned that at common law the performance of a
play was not an abandonment to public use, and since the copyright statute
did not expressly terminate that common law right, it still existed. Since
the case arose prior to the 1909 statute the Court probably decided the issue
of publication correctly. The pre-1909 statute did not contain any provision
for obtaining a statutory copyright for an unpublished work, nor was an
unsanctioned public performance by another an explicit statutory infringe-
ment. Under those circumstances, if the court had equated performance with
general publication, playrights would have had no remedy at common law
and none under the statute. The 1909 act, however, specifically remedied both
defects in the previous statute and, hence, any rational basis for Ferris ended
with that act.
For a critical analysis of the Ferris rationale see Kaplan, Publication in
Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469
(1955); Nimmer, supra note 61; Selvin, Shoud Performance Dedicate?, 42
CALir. L. REv. 40 (1954).
69. Several commentators have suggested that the exploitation test cur-
rently applied to books is in the process of supplanting the public perform-
ance doctrine enunciated in Ferris. See SPRING, op. cit. supra note 63, at 297;
Note, 2 WAYNE L. Rnv. 18, 27 (1955). Dicta contained in several opinions
gives some foundation for that assertion. See Z Bar Net, Inc. v. Helena Tele-
vision Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 595 (D.C. Mont. 1960); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950); Blanc v. Lantz, 83
U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
70. See note 68 supra.
71. 93 F. 2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938). Accord,
Tiffany Prod., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931); Universal Film Mfg.
Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1914); Brandon Films, Inc. v. Axjay
Enterprises, Inc., 38 Misc. 2d 794, 230 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1962); DeMille
Co. v. Casey, 121 Misc. 78, 201 N.Y. Supp. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1923). See Niusim.m,
COPYRGHT § 56 (1964).
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been lost. Similarly, radio broadcasting, by analogy to Ferris, has
been held to be only a performance resulting in no loss of com-
mon law rights in the material broadcast. 2 There is no apparent
reason to treat television broadcasting differently from either
radio broadcasting or the showing of motion pictures.
However, even if the act of broadcasting, by analogy to Ferris,
is held not to be a divestitive publication, the methods of dis-
tributing programs to local stations may operate as such a publi-
cation. Most national networks permit affiliated local broadcast-
ing stations to record "live" broadcasts and replay them at a
later time. This practice could be characterized as a performance
at which reproduction or copying of the underlying work is ex-
pressly permitted by the copyright proprietor. The network may
be considered to be the authorized performer, and the local sta-
tions to be an audience or group of users who are expressly per-
mitted to copy the performance. It may well be argued that the
divestitive publication occurs at the point of recording.
Indirect authority for this argument may be found in Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 8 where the Supreme Court, in
holding that the public exhibition of a painting did not result in
a divestitive publication, relied heavily on the fact that the exhib-
itor had expressly prohibited any copying of the work and had
taken measures to enforce that restriction. In Patterson v. Century
Prods., Inc., 4 the Second Circuit reached a similar result, fram-
ing the test of whether performance divestitively publishes a
work in terms of the nature of the rights given to a viewing audi-
ence. The court stated that divestitive publication does not occur
when the sole right granted is one to view or inspect the work.75
It is not clear that an express prohibition against copying is a
sine qua non of that result - at least one case contains dicta to
the contrary. However, when a local broadcaster acquires a
possessory interest in a tangible copy of the work in question,
whatever justification there is for the public performance doctrine
vanishes.7 Hence, it is quite possible that courts, unhappy with
72. Uproar v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934);
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 192 P.2d 495 (Cal. App. 1948),
aff'd, 208 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1949); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Docu-
mentaries Unlimited, 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
73. 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907).
74. 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937).
75. Id. at 492.
76. Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
77. See Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 756, 345 P.2d 546, 553 (1959).
See also Ninmer, supra note 61, at 197.
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the application of Ferris to the mass media, will hold that the acts
of broadcasting and copying divestitively publish the program.
The leasing or sale of programs to local stations by the copy-
right proprietor may likewise be deemed a divestitive publication.
There is no express authority for this position, and one case held
that the analogous practice in the motion picture industry of
leasing films to theatres for showing, as distinct from exhibiting
the films, does not result in a divestitive publication 8 However,
the Patterson court's failure to distinguish prior commercial leas-
ing of the film from the showing of the film and its equating of
both with public performance casts doubt on the correctness of
the decision.79 At any rate it is clear that an absolute sale of prints
of the film would be a divestitive publication;80 to allow a perpet-
ual common law monopoly in a film merely because the economics
of the industry favor leasing rather than sale of copies is to pro-
mote form at the expense of substance. Indeed, the Patterson
court in failing to find a divestitive publication, stressed the fact
that the film had never been placed in the regular chain of com-
mercial distribution. The implication is that extensive commer-
cial leasing would be deemed a divestitive publication."' Other
cases, involving the leasing of books, have equated leasing and
sale of copies and found divestitive publication.82 Motion pictures
are uniformly copyrighted as published works under section 10
of the Copyright Act, indicating at least an industry belief that
leasing results in divestitive publication. The result of applying
the motion picture distribution analogy to television programs,
leased in finished print form, is by no means certain. However,
the leasing of finished prints of programs provides a point at which
a divestitive publication test, based upon commercial exploitation,
could be employed without completely repudiating Ferris and the
public performance exception.
78. Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 803 U.S. 655 (1938).
79. But see Brandon Films, Inc. v. Arjay Enterprises, Inc,, 33 Misc. 2d
794, 230 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
80. See Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 Fed. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1914), aff'd, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1914); cases cited at note 24 supra.
81. Two commentators, relying on the Patterson dictum, conclude that
film leasing is not a divestitive publication; ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT AND THE
PUBLIc PERF oR ANc OF Music 16 (1954); Tannenbaum, Practical Problems
in Copyright, 7 COPYRIGHT PROBIEmS AwALrzE 10 (1952). Two other com-
mentators, relying on the same dictum, reach the opposite conclusion:
HowELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 118 (1952); NInmRa, COPYRIGHT § 56.1 (1965).
82. Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703 (C.C. D. Mass. 1896); Jewelers' Mer-
cantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49
N.E. 872 (1898).
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Since divestitive publication is generally considered to be a
question for local common law,s3 it is quite possible that some
state courts will continue to give broad application to the public
performance exception while others shift to the suggested test
based upon commercial exploitation. States relying upon com-
mercial exploitation may choose any one of three distinct points
for its application: the point of initial broadcast; the point of
"copying" by the local stations; or the point of leasing prints.
Divestitive publication of a single program, therefore, may de-
pend on which state borders are crossed by the television signal.
Even if conflicting judicial treatment ultimately proves more
hypothetical than real, a federal standard defining the public
performance exception would seem to be compelled by the public
policy of maximum access to information embodied in the copy-
right clause of the Constitution. 4 Permitting states to define
"publication" broadly could well frustrate the scheme of requir-
ing an author to relinquish his perpetual common law monopoly
for a limited one upon publication."5
A consistent definition of divestitive publication could be ob-
tained through either judicial or legislative action. Since Congress
has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under the Copyright Act,8 and since resolution of the ques-
83. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 921 F.2d
657 (2d Cir. 1955); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 187 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949);
Richard J. Cole, Inc. v. Manhattan Modes Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Super. Ct.),
aff'd per curiam, 2 App. Div. 2d 593, 157 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1956).
84. The works of an author are afforded protection not to reward creativity
per se, but, through subsidy to encourage their proliferation. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 181, 158 (1948); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 806 U.S.
80, 36 (1939); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1939). Ultimately,
therefore, copyright is bottomed on the public rather than private good, and
at some point the public should have unrestricted access to once protected
works. Assuming that "unpublished" works do not fall within the stated
policy, public interest in informational access ought to require that circula-
tion or commercial exploitation be deemed a divestitive publication so as to
force the acceptance of a limited monopoly on pain of forfeiture.
85. In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657,
664 (2d Cir. 1955), Judge Hand, in dissent, provides two reasons for treating
divestitive publication as a federal question: first, the copyright clause ex
proprio vigore prevents unlimited protection by the states, and the terminus
of that protection must be a federal constitutional question; and, second, a
policy of uniformity is inherent in federal copyright legislation. For a pene-
trating analysis of this dissenting opinion, see Kalodner & Vance, supra note
53.
86. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
364
tion of divestitive publication determines whether the statute is
available as alternative protection, definition of "divestitive pub-
lication" should be treated as a federal question. Amendment of
section 2 of the act seems preferable, however, for the public per-
formance exception is itself a creature of the judiciary. The
amendment should define divestitive publication to include com-
mercial exploitation of a work by the broadcasting mass media.
Until legislative clarification is forthcoming courts will prob-
ably hold that televising does not constitute a publication suffici-
ent to foreclose common law copyright. Thus it must be deter-
mined whether the activities of CATV amount to copyright
infringement.
C. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Since the rights granted the author of an unpublished work by
common law copyright are at least as extensive as those contained
in the copyright statute,17 section 1 of the act provides a conveni-
ent framework within which to consider the issue of infringement;
only in situations in which a common law copyright affords
greater protection than does section 1 will it become necessary to
distinguish between the two species of copyright protection. All
statutory actions for infringement are based on section 1 of the
act which defines the exclusive rights of the copyright proprietor.
Though the statute contains no definition of infringement, by
necessary implication it occurs when a person other than the copy-
right proprietor attempts to exercise a right reserved to the pro-
prietor. Most important of these rights for present purposes are
the rights to perform the work publicly for profit and to copy and
vend the work.
1. Public Performance
An inquiry to establish infringement of a right of public per-
formance by CATV activities is two-fold: first, it must be deter-
mined whether this right encompasses material broadcast by net-
work television; and, second, it must be determined whether
CATV activities constitute a "performance" which is "public."
Section 1(c) grants a public performance right in nondramatic
literary scripts,8 section 1(d) in dramatic scripts and photo-
87. See, e.g., Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632
(S.D. Cal. 1935).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1964).
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plays,s 9 and section 1(e). in broadcasts of musical compositions0
It is not clear that there is any exclusive performance right in a
motion picture other than a photoplay,91 and absent such a right,
nondramatic television programs not based on an underlying
"literary work," could be publicly performed with impunity. How-
ever, in light of the public performance right granted to the pro-
prietor of any nondramatic literary work, it is inconceivable that
a court would distinguish between a nondramatic script and a
nondramatic film; both would probably be protected under section
1 (c).92 Certainly the phrase "nondramatic literary work" is broad
enough to encompass nondramatic film. In addition, common
law copyright protection clearly extends to the public perform-
ance of unpublished films and scripts regardless of their dramatic
nature 8 Thus, the right of exclusive public performance encom-
passes most, if not all, television broadcast material. Most cases
finding infringement of the public performance right involve the
performance of musical compositions under section 1(e) of the act.
These cases appear to be authority under the similarly worded
sections 1(c) and 1(d); in fact, section 1(e) defines infringing ac-
tivity more narrowly than either 1(c) or 1(d) . 4 Hence, acts con-
stituting a performance under 1(e) a fortiori constitute 'a perform-
ance under 1(c) and 1(d).
In the prohibition of unauthorized or unlicensed broadcasting
of works protected by 1(c), 1(d), or 1(e), no distinction is made
between live performances or broadcasts and those recorded or
89. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1964). See, e.g., Chappell & Co., v. M/iddleton Farms
Mkt. & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1965). Dramatic films and photoplays registered
under § 5(l) have been held to be dramatic works within § 1(d). Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70 (1st Cir.
1932); Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911, 914 (D. Md. 1931).
91. Since § 1(d) refers only to dramatic works, a non-dramatic film regis-
tered under § 5(m) as a film other than a photoplay may not be within its pro-
visions. If § 1(c) is construed according to the eiusdem generie canon a film
may not qualify as a "nondramatic literary work," since only written works
may be protected by that section. Conceivably, therefore, since the non-
dramatic film cannot be called a "musical composition" under § 1(e), it may
not be afforded an exclusive performance right.
92. NnnR, COPYRIGHT § 109.4 (1965).
98. See Nnvn=, COPYRiGHT § 11 (1965); Warner, supra note 54, at 216.
94. Section 1(e) requires that the performance be for profit; neither §
1(c) or § 1(d) contain a similar limitation. Musical compositions are also
subject to a compulsory licensing provision when "records" of the composi-
tion are produced; no similar limitation is found in either § 1(c) or § 1(d).
Also, § 1(d) grants the exclusive right to perform and represent, while § 1(e)
only gives the right to perform.
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CATV
reproduced by mechanical meansO' However, a CATV does not
originate broadcasts, and the original performances rebroadcast
by a CATV are authorized by the copyright proprietor. In order
to find infringement, therefore, rebroadcasting.by a CATV must
be deemed a separate infringing performance.
In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,96 a hotel proprietor made
available to his guests, through the instrumentality of a radio
receiving set and loudspeakers installed in his hotel, copyrighted
music being broadcast from a radio station. The Supreme Court
held that the hotel's activities constituted a performance distinct
from the original broadcast, rejecting the defendant's argument
that the music was abandoned when broadcast and therefore
subject to capture. Under this "multiple performance" theory a
single broadcast may give rise to three infringing "performances":
that of the performing artist before his immediate audience; that
of the broadcaster or rebroadcaster; and that of the ultimate
recipient of the broadcast.9 7 A secondary user is deemed to in-
fringe, under this theory, by virtue of a separate infringing per-
formance, not by virtue of contributory infringement - causing a
separate, unsanctioned performance infringes even though the
original broadcast occurs with the consent of the copyright pro-
prietor. Thus, in Society of European Stage Authors & Com-
posers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co.,9s a secondary user
was held to have infringed even though both the performing artist
and the initial broadcaster were licensed to perform the work. The
fact that CATV systems only retransmit authorized broadcasts,
therefore, in no way affects their potential liability as unlicensed
secondary users.
CATV owners have argued that as mere conduits their recep-
tion service "reproduces" nothing. However, the receiving mech-
anism employed by the hotel owners in Buck and Statler is not
significantly different from the reception facilities possessed by a
CATV station; if anything, the latter are more extensive and
95. See Chappell & Co. v. Middletown Farmers Mt. & Auction Co., 334
F.2d 308 (3d. Cir. 1964); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc., 162
F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd sub -nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler
Tavern, Inc., 267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959).
96. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
97. See WAmqm, RADIO AND TLEVwsioN RIGHTS § 133(a) (1953); Note,
18 U. Cm. L. Rv. 757, 763 (1951); cf. Law v. National Broadcasting Co., 51
F. Supp. 798 (SD.N.Y. 1943); Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co.,
59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (Sfl.N.Y. 1943).
98. 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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sophisticatedY. Moreover, a CATV system not only transmits
signals received, but also refines and amplifies them, and, in some
cases, converts them from the channel on which they are received
to another for home reception. 00
On behalf of CATV systems it also could be argued that they
do not perform since they do not control the ultimate performing
device - the individual television set. However, in both Buck
and Statler this was also the case; hotel guests controlled the re-
ceiving sets in rented rooms. At any rate, the fact that activating
switches for reception axe in the hands of others ought not to be
determinative in light of the elaborate reception devices which are
owned and controlled by CATV systems. 1' Courts have protected
copyright regardless of the novelty or the technology employed
by the infringing party.10 2
Assuming that the activities of CATV amount to a separate
performance, such performances must also be "public" within the
meaning of sections 1(c), 1(d), 03 and 1 (e) to be infringing. Cases
have uniformly held that an originating broadcaster who performs
a copyrighted work does so publicly; 0 4 with respect to the radio
99. In Statler the hotel had two master receiving sets. The master sets
received and converted radio signals into audio-frequencies required by the
individual sets. The signal thereby obtained was first fed into several stages
of amplifying equipment, then into a master cable, and finally into distribution
wires having termination in nineteen hundred individual guest rooms. 19 F.
Supp. at 2, 3.
100. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
101. In Buck the hotel offered only one station and the broadcast was
carried to public as well as private rooms. The hotel selected the station and
controlled the transmissions into public rooms. In Statler, however, two sta-
tions were available and the transmissions were carried only to private rooms.
The guest, therefore, had to both select a station and activate the mechanism.
Despite the difference in both the amount of the control over selection of
programs and the identity of the "switchpresser," Statler followed Buck.
102. Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129, 134
(E.D. Pa. 1958); see Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929);
Buck v. Coe, 32 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1940); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed.
276 (ED. Pa. 1922).
103. A literal reading of the third clause of section 1(d), which prohibits
an unauthorized party from conveying the essence of a copyrighted dramatic
work to others "by any method whatsoever," could obviate the requirement
that an infringing performance of a dramatic work be public. See Tiffany
Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911, 915, (D. Md. 1931) (dictum). A prefer-
able reading of the clause, however, would incorporate the requirement of the
first clause that the exhibition or performance be public. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Distrib. Co. v. Wyatt & Maryland Yacht Club, 21 Co. Bull. 203
(1932). The literal interpretation would render the first clause nugatory.
104. See, e.g., Law v. National Broadcasting Co., 51 F. Supp. 798
broadcast of a copyrighted work, one court stated: "Nor can a
performance ...be deemed private because each listener may
enjoy it alone in the privacy of his home."'01 5 However, there is no
direct holding that rebroadcasting to private homes would like-
wise be held a public performance, although the Statler case, read
in conjunction with Jewell-LaSalle, would seem to suggest this
result. In Statler the broadcast reception was confined to private
bedrooms, whereas in Jewell-LaSalle the reproduction was heard
in the public rooms of the hotel as well. Nevertheless, the Statler
court, found that the hotel's performance was public on the
ground that the performance was directed to a substantial portion
of the public.' 6 The court saw no reason why the members of the
public must be gathered together so as to be able to communicate
with each other.10 7 Thus it is sufficient that the performance be
directed to the public; it is not necessary that a public gathering
witness the performance. At any rate, insofar as a CATV services
restaurants, bars, and other public places at which a public gath-
ering will view its rebroadcasts, there can be no doubt that the
performances are public.
However, there may be an additional requirement that a per-
formance be directed to the general public. The unlicensed exhi-
bition of copyrighted motion picture photo plays at a yacht club,
though given before a substantial audience, has been held not to
be a public performance of the photoplays within section 1(d)
where only members of the club and their guests could view the
performance. 08 The test applied was whether the performance was
open to the general public on the same terms as the original per-
formance. Since anyone can receive CATV transmissions merely
by paying the subscription fee, the performances are public even
under this permissive test.
Finally, it might be suggested that CATV service is the mere
(S.D.N.Y. 1943); Jerome H. lemick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F.2d
829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
105. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411, 412 (6th Cir. 1925). But of. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v.
Wyatt & Maryland Yacht Club, 21 Co. Bull. 203 (1932).
106. "[W]hen the owner of an hotel does as much as is done in the Hotel
Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction and transmission within its walls
of a broadcast program received by it, it must be considered as giving a per-
formance thereof .... " 19 F. Supp. at 4. (Emphasis added.)
107. "[T]he defendant's hypothesis that individual reception is an alibi to
a claim that its performance was public seems to me to be entirely destroyed."
19 F. Supp. at 5.
108. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt & Maryland Yacht
Club, 21 Co. Bull. 203 (1932).
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equivalent of a private antenna. Every television set requires
some type of antenna to "pull in" television signals, and a CATV
merely provides an extremely efficient one. Since the antenna
manufacturer also expands the range of television reception for
profit, arguably he should receive the same copyright treatment
as a CATV. However, such manufacturers expand the range of
reception without performing anything. Moreover, at the time of
reception of the television signals, the antennae are the property
of the individual homeowners and, hence, any resultant perform-
ance would be private rather than public. A CATV, on the other
hand, offers sustained reception for profit through an antenna
which it owns and controls and a network of cables running to
subscribers. This makes individual subscribers part of a unitary
system closely analogous to a paying audience' 0 9
2. Copy and Vend
In addition to the right of public performance, the copyright
proprietor has the exclusive right, under section 1(a), to copy and
vend his work." 0 Arguably CATV activities infringe this right;
however, although direct authority is lacking, several considera-
tions point to a contrary conclusion.
First, a "copy" ordinarily denotes a tangible object that is a
reproduction of the original work."' Adhering to this formula with
a vengeance, the Supreme Court held, in White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,112 that a player piano roll was not a
copy of the sheet music which it'reproduced when played. In the
opinion of the Court, "copy" implied a visual reproduction from
which the work could be read, and hence the making of a me-
chanical sound recording could not constitute copying. The
soundness of the Apollo rationale may be questioned in light of
the wide range of modern techniques for reproducing a work
without visual duplications; however, there is no apparent basis
for questioning the authority of the decision. The test of whether
a "copy" has been made, then, appears to be whether a visually
109. See Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New
York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1964).
111. See Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 Pa2d 546 (1959);
N wmisR, COPYRIGHT § 101.2 (1965). But see Patterson v. Century Prod., Inc.,
93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1988).
112. 209 US. 1 (1908).
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perceptible image has been reproduced from -the copyrighted
object. 13
Under this test the activities of a CATV would not seem to
infringe rights under section 1(a). When a CATV receives a tele-
vision signal it amplifies and refines the signal. It is not clear
whether the signal thereby created and relayed is something
separate and distinct from the original signal, or a duplication of
either the original signal or the underlying script; at any rate
under Apollo it is a "copy" of neither since it is intangible and
not subject to visual perception.
Arguably the visual image projected on a home television
screen is the infringing copy. However, if that is true there is
good reason to consider the home television set to be the copying
device rather than the CATV system."4 Even if joint responsibility
for producing the copy be conceded, a court would be unlikely to
hold that the owner of the set engages in illicit copying merely to
charge CATV systems with illicit copying under section 1 (a).
Second, any visual image passing the Apollo test, the produc-
tion of which could be attributed to a CATV, is only temporary,
and thus lacks one of the attributes commonly associated with a
copy. One case indicates that the concept of permanence is not
incorporated in section 1(a) so as to exclude the production of
evanescent copies; however, that case demands closer analysis.
In Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc.,"5 the defendants made a
duplicate of plaintill's nondramatic film and projected it before
an audience. The duplicate clearly was an infringing copy of the
original; however, the court went further in considering the pro-
jection of the film: "[W]hen the film was shown the defendants
who did that made an enlarged copy of the picture. It was to be
sure temporary but still a copy while it lasted."" 6 In evaluating
the precedent value of this statement, it should be noted that the
court probably was aware that a contrary statement, under the
then existing copyright statute, would have negated an exclusive
113. Thus a public performance would not constitute copying under § 1(a)
since it does not involve the production of a separate "copy." See Tiffany
Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911, 913 (D. Md. 1931); BAmI, LAw oF Copy-
RIGHT 334 (1944); SPRING, RISKS Am RIGHTs 111 (1952); WARN-, RADIo AND
TELEVISION RIGHTS § 154(a) (1953).
114. See Nhnmer, The Nature of the Rights Protected by Copyright, 10
U.CJL.A.L. REv. 60, 89 (1962). But cf. text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
115. 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 803 U.S. 655 (1938).
116. 93 F.2d at 493.
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public performance right in nondramatic films. 1 7 Another case
has rejected the Patterson dictum,18 and commentators have been
generally critical of it.n" Thus, there is no strong authority for
finding television screen images to be infringing copies under sec-
tion 1(a); in the absence of such authority CATV's are likely to
be shielded by a permanence requirement as well as by the
visible reproduction requirement of Apollo. A common law copy-
right, on the other hand, may be infringed by an evanescent,
nonintelligible copy. At least one commentator concludes that it
would be;' however, no case has decided the question.
The copyright proprietor also has the exclusive right under
section 1(a) to vend his work. Since the rights granted in section
1(a) are cumulative, arguably a second product, though not a
"copy" of the copyrighted work, may yet infringe the exclusive
vending right. It has been held, however, that this right to vend
may be exercised only with respect to copies of the work.'2 Since
a CATV will not infringe section 1(a) unless its product is a
"copy" of the protected work, nothing is gained by relying on
the vending subsection of section 1(a).'m
In conclusion, a CATV probably does not infringe section 1(a)
of the act, but probably does perform publicly within the mean-
ing of the prohibition contained in sections 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e).
Although a copyright violation probably can be established on
the basis of the multiple performance doctrine, the interests of
the viewing public ought not to be overlooked. Copyright itself
is merely an accommodation between the rights of "artists" and
the public. The prime objective of any television policy ought to
117. The film in Patterson was a film other than a photoplay and as such
not literally within the public performance protection of § 1(d); § 1(c) had
not yet been amended to include performance protection for any "nondramatic
literary work."
118. Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). See also White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908); Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Co. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66 (D.
Mass. 1933); Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931).
119. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 190 (1944); NmniER, COPYRIGHT § 101.6
(1965); WARNER, RADIO AD TEmvisiox RIGHTS § 154a (1953); WEre, Copr-
RIGHT LAw 406 (1917).
120. See NnuVum, COPYRIGHT § 111 (1965).
121. Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1911);
Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliot Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717, 718
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
122. See Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572, 573 (9th
Cir. 1941); NnunmsR, COPYRIGHT § 103.2 (1965).
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be broad television coverage at low prices to the viewing public.
To the extent that CATV systems operate in areas that regular
broadcasting stations either cannot or will not service, CATV
provides a needed service. It may not be desirable to require,
under the copyright law, that such rebroadcasters obtain a license
from the originating station for the use of the programs. The
originating station may well refuse such a license to its com-
petitor, a CATV, and, even if one is given, the cost will be directly
transferred to the viewing subscribers. It may be argued on the
contrary, however, that to exempt CATV from the multiple per-
formance doctrine would ultimately run counter to the interests
of the viewing public. As long as a CATV can make use of pro-
grams without compensating the originating station for their use
it has a competitive advantage over any station that may wish
to locate in an area serviced by a CATV. Given such a competitive
disadvantage, a station which could offer free programming to
the area viewers would probably never locate in a CATV-serviced
area. The result could be a frustration of the policy of broad free
television coverage and a deprivation of television service to the
extent that potential viewers cannot afford to meet the sub-
scription rates which a CATV charges.
IV. COPYRIGHT REVISION BILL
Congress currently has before it a bill designed to revise the
Copyright Act,1 3 several sections of which would affect the copy-
right status of CATV. Section 106 of the bill gives the copyright
proprietor exclusive transmission rights in his work subject to the
exceptions embodied in section 109. Section 101 broadly defines
"transmission" to include the use of any device or means whereby
images or sounds are received beyond the initial place of send-
ing.-u CATV is definitely engaged in transmission under that
definition and will infringe the public performance right granted
by section 106, unless it may be brought within the exception
embodied in section 109(5).2 5 Section 109 provides:
128. H.R. 4847, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
124. Id. J 101.
125. The preliminary draft predecessor of §§ 109(5) and 101, § 18, applied
to CATV without question:
§ 13 Scope of Exclusive Right With Respect to Broadcasting and
Diffusion:




... the following are not infringements of copyright:
(5) the further transmitting to the public of a transmission embodying
a performance or exhibition of a work, if the further transmission is
made without altering or adding to the content of the original transmis-
sion, without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage,
and without charge to the recipients of the further transmission.' 6
Commercial CATV operates for profit, and hence is not saved
from copyright infringement by section 109(5).
Whether nonprofit cooperative CATV's would also infringe the
public performance right is less clear; although a commercial pur-
pose is lacking, the ultimate recipient is still charged for program
reception. Hence, sections 106 and 109(5), if read literally, would
render both commercial and nonprofit CATV's liable for infringe-
ment. However, in the comments appended to the predecessor 12T
of section 109(5) of the final bill, a spokesman for the Copyright
Office, which drafted that provision, stated that it was meant to
allow "relays, boosters, master antennas ... and the like," but to
forbid unauthorized CATV broadcasts where "people are really
operating for profit."' 28 Thus, it is not clear that the drafters of
the predecessor of section 109(5) ever distinguished between
commercial and nonprofit cooperative CATV's. By negative impli-
cation, however, when a CATV is not "really operating for profit"
it could be considered to be merely a noninfringing "booster" or
"master antenna." Section 109(5) is open to a similar reading.
(2) Rebroadcasting or rediffusion of the program, over wires or other-
wise, for reception on ordinary home receiving sets, where the broadcast
signals are merely being strengthened in power without being altered
in wave length or content, and where the program is not being retrans-
mitted to the subscribers to a rediffusion service. (Emphasis added.)
(c) As the terms are used in this section:
(4) 'Rediffusing' is the simultaneous retransmission, as part of a rediffu-
sion service such as a community antenna system ... to subscribers
who require special apparatus to receive them, and who pay for recep-
tion of the signals. (Emphasis added.)
STAFF OF Housa Comnv. oN THE JuDIcIARY, 88th CONG., 2d SEss., COPYRIGHT
LAw REvISION Part 3, § 13 (Comm. Print 1964).
Though the present bill does not specifically mention CATV, the official
comments to § 106 clearly include unauthorized CATV transmissions within
the acts prohibited by § 106. RoismTEa OF CoPyRIGHTs SurPraumNa.Ry RE-
PORT ON THE GENERAL REvIsION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 42 (1965).
126. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1965).
127. STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 88th CONG. 2d SEss.,
LAW REVIsION Part 3, § 13 (Comm. Print 1964).
128. Id. at 240.
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When a CATV is operated on a cooperative basis, the monthly
service charge could be considered a payment for the cooper-
atively owned facility rather than a recompense for the trans-
mission. The Copyright Office, however, appears to have rejected
such an interpretation of section 109(5). No system serving a
limited class of subscribers may qualify for exemption under
section 109(5) irrespective of the lack of profit motive. 9
Apart from the ambiguities inherent in section 109(5), that
section of the revision bill fails to resolve problems central to the
entire CATV problem. For, neither a blanket inclusion of profit
and nonprofit CATV's within the protection of the copyright act,
nor the total exclusion of nonprofit CATV's will necessarily har-
monize with the policy of eventual universal free television cover-
age. In isolated areas profit community antennas may provide the
sole means of reception, while in areas already serviced adequately
by free stations, even cooperative antenna systems may prove a
crushing competitive burden to local broadcasters. Copyright,
with its rigid test of infringement, does not seem to be the proper
vehicle for striking the necessarily delicate balance among the
interests of the original broadcaster, the local stations, the copy-
right proprietor, and the viewing public. It is suggested that a
more flexible device is required.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the copyright
liability of a CATV for the use of programming should be deter-
mined by a standard more flexible than the mechanical test of
copyright infringement. While the copyright proprietor should
be compensated for the use of his product, the public interest in
the availability of television service requires the use of a "bal-
ancing of interests" approach. A CATV which provides the only
television coverage in a given area, even if operated for profit,
ought to be exempted from the Copyright Act. In markets cur-
rently serviced by free stations, however, no public interest over-
rides the copyright proprietor's right to compensation.
Unfortunately, both the prior bills 30 and the current FCC
129. "On the other hand, we do not believe that the same considerations
apply to the activities of those who install or operate a nonprofit 'translator,'
'booster,' or similar equipment which merely amplifies broadcast signais and
retransmits them to everyone in an area for free reception." SuprrNTAxny
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENmALR EVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 42-43 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
130. S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 1044, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H.R. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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regulations are aimed solely at correcting a competitive situation
within the communications industry; the FCC has repeatedly
recognized that it has no power to consider the copyright ques-
tion.la1 Hence, the following impasse results: the FCC in formu-
lating CATV regulations cannot consider the interests of the
copyright proprietor; the courts in applying the copyright law
cannot vary the infringement standard to meet disparate cover-
age conditions. It would appear that a hybrid device is needed
to accommodate both areas of legitimate concern.
Initially, all CATV systems should be brought within the
Copyright Act. Next the copyright statute should provide a
method of selective exclusion contingent upon the granting of an
FCC certificate. The FCC could be empowered to issue a certifi-
cate of exemption only after an affirmative showing that the
presence of a CATV would be in the public interest. Prime con-
sideration ought to be given to the existing free television cover-
age. An analogous public interest standard is currently used to
license new television stations and CATV microwave facilities. In
the past the FCC has opposed a mandatory CATV license require-
ment, arguing such a system would be burdensome and ineffectual.
An optional copyright exemption certificate, however, is not open
to similar criticism. Since few CATV's could prove public con-
venience, any increase in administrative burden would be slight.
Nor would the optional certificate interfere with either the present
FCC regulations, or any future regulations designed to protect
local stations from the competition of a CATV. The proposed
device will incorporate a proper concern for the public interest
into the copyright infringement standard, yet reserve to the
agency charged with the administration of communication policy
a matter within its particular expertise.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the present time network broadcasters rely almost exclu-
sively on common law copyright to protect rights in their pro-
grams. This practice is likely to continue as long as broadcasting
is not held to constitute a divestitive publication. There appears
to be no justification, however, for the current public perform-
ance exception to the concept of divestitive publication; there is
no reason for allowing broadcasters and others who publicly per-
form a work to exploit fully such works and yet retain their per-
petual common law monopoly. It has been suggested that the
131. 1959 Inquiry 11; FCC, First Report 1787.
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exploitation test of publication should be legislatively incor-
porated into section 9 of the current act so that all authors will
receive equal treatment under the copyright law.
Whether CATY's infringe rights reserved to authors or their
successors in interest is unclear. Under present case law, rebroad-
casting by a CATV probably would be held to be a public per-
formance under section 1(c), (d) and (e), although that result is
by no means certain. CATV does not appear to infringe section
1(a) rights to copy and vend the copyrighted work.
The legal concept of copyright infringement does not provide
the best vehicle for adjusting the delicate balance between con-
flicting interests which the problem of CATV requires. In areas
where CATV offers the only feasible means of television reception,
the interests of the viewers ought to take precedence over those
of the broadcaster. But in areas already receiving adequate service
from existing free stations, a CATV ought to be held a public
performer within sections 1(c), (d) and (e). There are two means
of effecting such a balance of interests. First, CATV's which are
nonprofit in nature could be specifically exempted from the pro-
visions of the act; there is some evidence that the copyright
revision bill takes this approach. This solution, while uncompli-
cated, would not prevent nonprofit CATV's from operating in
areas already properly serviced by free stations. An alternative
would be to bring CATV's under the control of the FCC and
then exempt them from the Copyright Act on an individual basis
if the FCC so directs. The FCC could be empowered to issue the
certificate only after a showing that the presence of a CATV in
the given area would be in the best interests of the viewing audi-
ence, and that its presence would not duplicate free coverage.
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